The main purpose of this
Introduction
The access to an effective remedy for victims of human rights violations is an internationally recognised right guaranteed under international and regional human rights law. For instance, at the international level, this right is provided for under Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1 as well as Article 2(3)(a) and (b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 2 In Europe, the same right is provided for under Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as by Article 14 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 3 . At the African Union (AU) level, although the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (African Charter) does not have a specific provision of that kind, its Article 1 obliges Member States to respect and enforce the rights enshrined therein. Moreover, its Article 7(1) provides that 'every individual shall have the * LLM in International and Public European Law from Erasmus University of Rotterdam, Advanced Master in Human Rights from the Leuven Academy in Belgium. 1 this date it is remarkable that the African countries remain a favourite destination for MNCs of varying nations. The term MNC itself in this paper refers to "a legal person that owns or controls production, distribution or service facilities outside the country in which it is based", 10 while the term MNCs' accountability refers to the legal responsibility of MNCs vis-à-vis their obligation to respect human rights under national legislations and international and regional human rights law.
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There are many reasons that render the AUMSs attractive to MNCs. First, the AUMSs are "resource-rich."
12 According to the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC), the current MNC investments that are booming in the AUMSs are linked to continuous discoveries of oil, gas and minerals sites as well as new prospects in agriculture in the AUMS. 13 As stated by the Institute of the West-Asia and African Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 'African countries contain more than half of the world resources of cobalt, manganese, gold and significant supplies of platinum, uranium and oil.' 14 According to scholars like Chella, the natural resources from the AUMSs generate billions of dollars in the extractive industries. 15 In other words, MNCs are mostly attracted to the natural resources that the African continent abounds. Moreover, unlike a number of other continents, Africa records a high rate of population growth, a fact which has a direct correlation with a cheap workforce likely to sustain activities of these MNCs across the African continent as well as a consumer market growth. 16 In addition, most of these MNCs which invest in the AUMSs are often subjected to fewer regulatory constraints or are accorded many concessions for purposes of attracting them. 
B. MNCs and Human Rights Abuses in the AUMSs
It is comprehensible that the activities of MNCs are needed in the AUMSs because they contribute to the development of their economies, create more jobs, bring new technologies, and contribute to building new and modern infrastructures across these countries. 18 On the other hand, there are many controversies on how these MNCs fail to respect human rights in the AUMSs. In pursuit of their economic interests, a large number of MNCs operating in the AUMS are currently accused of being involved in human rights abuses.
19 Some of them are even alleged to be implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as supporting repressive regimes in many AUMS. 20 For example, reports from various human rights organisations have alleged implications of more than 80 MNCs, from developed and developing countries, in the illegal exploitation of natural resources, forced labour, and distribution of weapons to different armed groups in the current conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 21 A prime example is the AngloGold Ashanti mining company from South Africa which was accused of buying weapons and funding criminal activities of different rebel movements during the ethnic conflicts in the Ituri region in Eastern DRC.
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As argued by Kremnitzer, MNCs enjoy much more economic and political influence than their host states as they retain "limitless capacities to do well and to cause harm."
23 This is the case in many AUMSs where MNCs use their economic powers to control, not only their economies, but also other key sectors including politics and justice systems. 24 In other words, the economic vulnerability of many AUMS renders them vulnerable vis-a-vis MNCs, a fact that has a negative impact on human rights and in particular on the right to access effective remedies by victims of MNCs. The power influence of MNCs weighs more on AUMS because these countries are still facing challenges such as extreme poverty, poor governance, corruption, inefficiency of their judicial systems, and armed conflict.
According to Mnyongani, nowadays, MNCs have become strategic in their approaches because they prefer to invest in countries whose human rights records are poor. 25 This also means that the AUMS' desperate need for investments constitutes another fact that renders them vulnerable vis-à-vis MNCs. To attract MNCs to their countries, most AUMSs accord concessions, in terms of compliance with human rights standards, to MNCs in their investment agreements. The same fact also explains why many AUMS often try to cover or hide human rights abuses that are committed by MNCs on their territories, 26 or co-operate with them in their perpetration. 27 By investing in such countries, these MNCs are aware that in case they abuse human rights their hosts will be unable or unwilling to hold them accountable for their wrongdoing in national jurisdictions. Although every AUMS is free to design its own legal framework in order to attract as many MNCs as possible to its territory, such legal framework has to comply with the international human rights instruments to which it is a party. More practically, the bilateral agreements between AUMSs and MNCs should be designed in such a way as to guarantee the right of access to effective remedies for those whose human rights are affected by the activities of the MNC in question.
II. Cases of MNC's Human Rights Abuses in the AU MS: The Elusive Quest for Remedies by Victims
In case of human rights violations, international law requires that the perpetrators be brought to justice, regardless of whether they are natural or legal persons, such as MNCs.
28
The victims' rights to access effective remedies in case of human rights abuses is also provided for under various national constitutions, procedurals rules, and regulations in different countries including those of the African Union. These human rights instruments, regulations, and national legislations require states to investigate and to punish the perpetrators and to repair the damages suffered by victims in case of any human rights abuse. As mentioned earlier in the introduction of this paper, the UNGPs also require MNCs to play an active role in the promotion and the protection of the victims' right to access effective remedies in cases where they are implicated in human rights abuses.
Despite the existence of such obligation imposed upon the AUMSs and MNCs, nowadays, the lack of access to effective remedies for victims of the MNCs' human rights abuses from the AUMSs has become a major concern. Today, there are many MNCs operating in the AUMSs that stand accused of involvement in human rights abuses while their victims face many barriers to access effective remedies in domestic jurisdictions. 29 The same cases are often also brought before the MNCs' home jurisdictions or in other foreign domestic fora but without success.
For further exploration of this topic, three cases were selected to illustrate the complex challenges that victims of such abuses face in their quest for remedies. These cases shed light on the inefficiency of the justice systems in AUMSs vis-à-vis human rights abuses committed by MNCs. They highlight how MNCs undermine the victims' right to access effective remedies within domestic jurisdictions and in jurisdictions outside the AUMS as well as the conflict of interests that AUMS' governments are often confronted with. Finally, these cases illustrate a general challenge that these victims face which warrants the establishment of African regional or sub-regional solutions. In concrete the examination of these cases focuses on the three following points: 1) the nature of violations in terms of what happened and the role played by an MNC in the perpetration of the alleged human rights abuses; 2) the types of remedies pursued by victims and where those remedies were pursued; 3) the obstacles faced by victims in pursuit of said legal remedies, either in domestic courts 27 32 The Kilwa town was a strategic point for Anvil Mining's operations due to its location near the Lake Moëro port. The company used this port to facilitate all its operations in the former Katanga province in the South-East region of the DRC. 33 According to the latest provincial reforms, the town of Kilwa is now situated in the province of Haut-Katanga.
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The Anvil Mining case illustrates the barriers that victims of human rights abuses face due to the dysfunction, irregularities and political interference within domestic justice systems. It also exhibits the reluctance of the MNCs' home courts, along with other foreign domestic jurisdictions, to address human rights abuses committed by MNCs in the AUMSs.
ii. A Brief Description of the Facts
The facts around the involvement of Anvil Mining in human rights abuses in Kilwa were internationally revealed in a report of the United Nations Mission (MONUSCO) in the DRC. 35 The same facts were also exposed by reports from human rights DRC's soldiers committed many human rights violations. These abuses included the killing of more than 100 civilians, 38 torture, rape, widespread looting, extortions of civilians' properties and arbitrary detentions. 39 Many reports on the incident claimed that Anvil Mining's vehicles were used in the transportation of looted property as well as the transport of corpses to mass graves. 40 The same reports also alleged that Anvil Mining's aeroplanes were used in the transfer of arrested civilians from Kilwa to Lubumbashi (the capital city of the Katanga province). 41 Additionally, during an interview with Anvil Mining's representative by the MONUSCO investigators, he acknowledged having provided vehicles, drivers, aeroplanes, food rations and the payment of salaries to the DRC's military forces.
42
In brief, the facts of this case prove that it is unquestionable that Anvil Mining bears great responsibility for the human rights abuses committed in Kilwa on 14 th October 2004. In legal terms, Anvil Mining acted in complicity with the DRC soldiers in the commission of human rights violations in Kilwa. Its responsibility stems from the fact that this company facilitated the perpetration of such abuses by DRC soldiers.
iii. The Victims' Endeavours to Access Effective Remedies After the publication of various reports on the Kilwa incident, the international community exerted pressure on the DRC's government, requesting it to bring to justice those presumed to be implicated in human rights abuses in Kilwa. In collaboration with victims, the Prosecutor of the Military Court of Lubumbashi opened an investigation. 43 This investigation was completed in October 2006 and has led to charges against nine government soldiers for war crimes, arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as torture and murder. 44 Three employees of Anvil Mining were also accused of aiding and abetting the government's soldiers in the perpetration of the above-mentioned violations. 45 On 28 June 2007, the Lubumbashi military court dismissed these accusations by concluding that what happened in Kilwa was simply the 'incidental results of the fighting' and therefore acquitted all the accused. Likewise, Anvil Mining, which was not formally accused before the court, was also cleared of any charge in relation to this case. 46 In collaboration with victims, the Prosecutor appealed against that decision but in vain. In its decision of December 2007, the military high court of Lubumbashi declared that the victims' claims against Anvil Mining would not be examined in the appeal, therefore, 38 
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restricting that request to the cases examined by the lower court. 47 In other words, the Military and the High Military Courts of Lubumbashi declared the accusations against Anvil Mining to be inadmissible without any clear legal ground. For the retained charges, the appellate court merely confirmed the decision of the lower court and therefore acquitted all of the accused, including three employees of Anvil Mining. 48 Since Anvil Mining had other main offices in Australia during the Kilwa incident, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) opened an investigation into the company in September 2004. 49 However, this investigation was closed after the case was rejected by the DRC's courts. 50 Moreover, as Anvil Mining was from Canada, victims brought their cases before the Canadian courts, without success. With the assistance of the Canadian Association against Impunity (CAAI), victims of these abuses filed their complaints in the Superior Court of Quebec in November 2010. 51 In its first decision of April 2011, the Court declared itself to be competent to adjudicate the case. 52 The Judge found that the case's rejection in Canada would result in the denial of the victims' right of access to an effective remedy. 53 In fact, the possibility for this case to be heard in other domestic fora was exhausted. However, on 25 January 2012, this decision was unfortunately reversed by the Appellate Court on the ground that the Canadian courts are not competent to rule on this case because victims failed to prove their impossibility to access a remedy in other fora. 54 Victims and their supporters appealed against this decision before the Supreme Court but in vain. In its decision of November 2012, the Canadian Supreme Court declared that 'it would not hear the plaintiffs' appeal.' 55 
iv. Obstacles Faced by Victims in the Pursuit of Remedies
The major obstacles faced by victims in domestic courts include first of all dysfunctions and irregularities within the DRC's justice system. According to different external observers, the trials of this case before the DRC's courts were characterised by a lack of independence and transparency, significant barriers in lawyer's access to victims, and lack of co-operation with the military authorities. 56 Secondly, various awareness campaigns for victims and local leaders were conducted by the government authorities and military officials, requesting them to drop their accusations against Anvil Mining on the grounds that this company had contributed much to their well-being. 57 The MONUSCO report also alleged that government 61 For others, like Abiodun, MNCs and most of their host AUMSs share the same objective of exploiting the natural resources in these countries while the protection of human rights is relegated to the background. 62 In this case, it is clear that the DRC should choose either the protection of its economic interests or the provision or real remedies to victims. Consequently, the outcome of the proceedings before the Military and the High Military courts of Lubumbashi showed that the priority was given to economic interests rather than the protection of human rights.
The main obstacle faced by victims in accessing effective remedies in Canada and Australia was the unwillingness of both countries to prosecute Anvil Mining for its wrongdoing abroad. Despite the fact that the Canadian judges were aware that this case was unfairly rejected by the DRC's jurisdictions, Canadian courts rejected it on the ground that victims were unable to prove their impossibility to access effective remedies in other domestic fora. In Australia, this case was not even brought before any court. After its dismissal by the DRC's courts, under the conditions described above, the Australian Federal Police abandoned its investigation against Anvil Mining. According to the BHRRC, the MNC's home countries frequently do not want to restrain their companies in carrying out their activities abroad, and this was the scenario in the Anvil Mining case.
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Although victims were unable to overcome the obstacles to access effective remedies in the domestic courts (as well as in other foreign domestic jurisdictions), in 2010 the same case was brought before the ACHPR where, in June 2017, the ACHPR condemned the DRC to pay USD 2.5 million to compensate the victims and obligated it to re-open criminal 58 investigations against the perpetrators of the human rights violations of Kilwa. 64 Moreover, in the SERAC v. Nigeria case, the ACHPR previously held Nigeria to also be responsible for the degradation of the environment in Ogoni Land. In reality, however, these abuses were committed by Shell, a Dutch MNC. 65 Even if in the two decisions the ACHPR was clearly influenced by the traditional view of international law, where violations can only be found against states and not private entities, the ACHPR was used to force member states to provide effective remedies to victims.
B. The Talisman's Case of Sudan i. Introduction Talisman Energy (known simply as Talisman) was one of the largest MNCs from Canada engaged in the exploitation, development, production, transportation, and marketing of crude oil and natural gas. 66 This company operated in Sudan from August 1998 until March 2003. 67 During the same period, Talisman sustained other activities in various parts of the world including the U.S. 68 As of January 2016, Talisman Energy has acquired a new name and is now called Repsol Oil & Gas Canada. 69 The entry of Talisman into partnership with the Sudanese government in 1998 was highly criticised by different countries and many human rights organisations because Sudan was accused of using the oil revenue to finance the war during which many human rights violations were reported to be committed. 70 After the installation of Talisman in Sudan, the criticism did not cease. For example, in 2000, Canada, in which Talisman was incorporated, continued to denounce the use of the oil revenue by the government of Sudan in the exacerbation of the conflict in that country. 71 Analysis of the criticism, which was addressed to Talisman, suggests that this company was likely to have been aware that its activities in Sudan would have negative impacts on the rights of the non-Muslim populations who were targeted by the Sudanese military and pro-government militias during the ongoing war.
This case illustrates how a collaboration between an MNC and its host AUMS in the violation of human rights constitutes a major obstacle to the victims' right to access effective remedies in national jurisdictions. It also reveals how similar AUMSs lack appropriate laws to deal with the MNC's human rights abuses committed on their territories. Moreover, the present case also captures other barriers that these victims face in foreign domestic jurisdictions, such as diplomatic relations or political interference, that hinder their right of access to an effective remedy.
ii. A Brief Description of the Facts As Talisman landed in Sudan during the civil war, it was necessary to first obtain security guarantees from the Sudanese government to be able to operate. For that purpose, in 1999 the Sudanese government re-grouped all MNCs which were engaged in oil exploitation in Sudan in what they called the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GOPC) where a security arrangement was concluded with them. 72 Firstly, under the arrangement, the GOPC was requested to build the roads linking the military bases with the oil concession areas and to upgrade two airports that could be used by Sudanese soldiers within the oil exploitation areas. Secondly, the Sudanese government committed to open military garrisons around the oil exploitation fields. 73 As argued by Kobrin, while Talisman was one of the MNCs within the GOPC, its huge funding and technical expertise were crucial for the success of that initiative. 74 Later on it was reported that the facilities upgraded by the GOPC group, in which Talisman had a prominent role, were used by the Sudanese military forces and the pro-government militias in the perpetration of gross human rights abuses in Sudan. For instance, the Heglig, one of the airports upgraded by Talisman in its area of exploitation, was used by the Sudanese forces and the pro-government militias to carry out indiscriminate attacks against civilians. 75 In its report of 2000 on the situation in Sudan, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as Talisman itself confirmed the use of the Heglig airport by the Sudanese forces during the attacks against Christians and other non-Muslim people in Sudan. 76 It was also alleged that the same airport was frequently used by the Sudanese military forces to refuel their aeroplanes during their operations in which numerous human rights abuses were committed.
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In legal terms, Talisman's responsibility in the alleged human rights abuses arises from its close co-operation with the Sudanese government in the killings of Christians and other non-Muslims of Sudan. This is why Talisman was accused in American courts of aiding and abetting the Sudanese security forces and the pro-government militias in the perpetration of human rights abuses in Sudan. Moreover, many observers agree that Talisman benefited from these violations because its oil activities expanded in that region during that period. iii. The Victims' Endeavours to Access Effective Remedies Given the nature of the acts which were committed and the direct involvement of the Sudanese government in their perpetration, victims were afraid to seek remedies in domestic courts. For that reason, on 8 November 2001, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan together with other residents from Southern Sudan -a region where Talisman was operating -filed a case against Talisman in the New York District Court. 79 The plaintiffs accused Talisman to have collaborated with the Muslim government of Sudan in violating the rights of Christians and other non-Muslim people around its areas of operation. 80 In concrete terms, Talisman was accused of aiding and abetting the Sudanese government in 'the killing, forcible displacement, war crimes, confiscation and destruction of property, kidnapping, rapes, and enslavement' of Christians and other non-Muslim people in the South Sudanese region; acts which together were qualified as genocide. 81 This case was introduced in the US Court under the Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA), providing US federal courts with powers to deal with cases of human rights abuses committed by MNCs abroad irrespective of the nationality of the victims or the MNCs in question. 82 Before ruling on the merits of such cases, in practice, the U.S. courts must first weigh the facts against the forum non conveniens doctrine. This doctrine allows US courts to dismiss a case if the defendant is able to prove the existence of another appropriate forum to deal with the case and to take into account other public or private interests, such as the possibilities of both parties to access evidence. 83 In the New York District Court's decision of March 2003, the judges initially allowed the case to proceed. In the decision, the judge first questioned the independence of the Sudanese courts because the Sudanese forces and the pro-government militias were alleged to be the direct perpetrators of these abuses. 84 Secondly, the judge held that the application of Sharia law to victims who were largely nonMuslims was unfair. 85 Moreover, the Court found that the Canadian courts were not the appropriate forum to deal with the case because Canada lacked proper legislation to deal with the situation at hand and therefore decided to dismiss Talisman's defence. 86 However, this decision has been strongly contested by the Canadian and American governments, in such way that their opinions have influenced, in one way or another, the final outcome of this case in the US courts. According to Seck, Canada intervened twice to support Talisman before the US courts. 87 Likewise, when this case was ongoing in the New York District Court, the American government sent a letter to that court with a diplomatic correspondence from Canada that contained an attachment explaining that a continuation of this case in the US will have an impact on the diplomatic relations between the two countries. In the same letter, the US authorities also advised the judges of the New York District Court to narrow the application of the ATCA. 88 It appears that the Canadian and US governments were not concerned about the redress of the abuses which were alleged against Talisman, rather than the pursuit of this case in US courts. The reluctance of both countries to provide effective remedies to victims of these abuses is easily observed through the efforts deployed by both, the Canadian and the US government, to obstruct the victims' right to access effective remedies in US courts. Consequently, in 2006, just four months before the trial of this case on its merits, a summary judgement was issued by the same New York District Court in favour of Talisman in which the court ruled that Talisman did not act with 'an intent' of supporting the Sudanese government in abusing human rights. 89 In February 2007, representatives of victims appealed against that decision but without success. In its decision of October 2009, the Appellate Court for the 2 nd Circuit upheld the decision of the lower court in which the Judge stressed again that Talisman did not act 'purposefully' to support the Sudanese government in the perpetration of human rights abuses. 90 Yet in the same decision, the 2 nd circuit Appellate Court acknowledged that victims managed to prove that Sudan has used Talisman's facilities to commit human rights violations. 91 Trying to reverse the decision, representatives of victims filed a petition to the US Supreme Court. Another organisation called Earth Rights International also submitted amicus curiae to the same court. The complainants were requesting the Supreme Court to hear the appeal against the ruling from the Court of Appeal. 92 But in October 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected these two requests. 93 As a result, Talisman was discharged from its responsibility in human rights violations in which the company is alleged to have played a big role.
iv. Obstacles Met by the Victims to Access Effective Remedies
The facts in the Talisman case reveal two major difficulties encountered by victims to access effective remedies in the Sudanese courts. First, victims were physically threatened. Given the role played by the Sudanese military and the pro-government militias in the abuses which were alleged against Talisman and the nature of the conflict (ethnic and religious conflict), victims were unable to have their case heard in the Sudanese courts. The collusion between government forces and MNCs in the perpetration of human rights abuses is not unique to Sudan. The same scenario is often alleged in many AUMSs where their victims become unable to bring cases in domestic courts for fear of their physical safety. Second, the independence of the Sudanese justice system, as well as the nature of the applicable law in the Sudanese courts, was questionable since they apply Sharia Law even though all victims were non-Muslims. It appears inconceivable to pretend to access effective remedies under the rules of a religion to which you do not belong yourself.
The main obstacle faced by victims to access effective remedies in the US courts was the political interference by both, Canada and the US. The introduction of this case before the New York District Court has raised many reactions from both countries to oppose its continuation within US jurisdiction, reactions which have led to its rejection in the US. Victims could not bring their case in Canadian courts due to the fact that Canada had played an important role in its rejection by the American courts. But legally speaking, the US courts used the concept of 'proof of intent' which, in reality, is not easy to demonstrate in such cases. As argued by de Jonge, in these cases the proof of intent is more complicated than the proof of knowledge. 94 In other words, this new standard introduced by US courts in cases implicating MNCs and human rights constitutes an additional obstacle for victims of the MNCs' human rights abuses from the AUMSs who would like to seek remedies in US courts.
C. The Trafigura Case of Ivory Coast
i. Introduction Trafigura is an MNC from the Netherlands which has its headquarters in Amsterdam. The company also has many other offices and subsidiaries in different countries worldwide.
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Trafigura is among the world's largest MNCs trading oil, metals and minerals. 96 The incident at the centre of this case took place on the night of 19 August 2006 when a ship charted by a Trafigura office in London, called Probo Koala, dumped toxic wastes in Abidjan, the capital city of Ivory Coast. 97 As this ship belonged to Trafigura's London office, presumably, the orders to dump these toxic wastes in Abidjan emanated from the same office.
The present case illustrates how MNCs use their power to undermine the victims' right of access to effective remedies in domestic jurisdictions of the AUMSs. It also reveals that the Ivory Coast, like many other AUMSs, lacks appropriate laws to deal with human rights abused committed by MNCs on their territories. Furthermore, the case also demonstrates how the victims' chance to access effective remedies in other foreign domestic jurisdiction is limited.
ii. A Brief Description of the Facts
Before heading to Abidjan, the Probo Koala ship tried first to dispose of these toxic wastes legally in some European ports but without success. question. 98 After its arrival in Amsterdam, a company which was sub-contracted by the Amsterdam port to carry out this job discovered that the toxicity of the waste was very high and decided to increase the price of their treatment. 99 As most MNCs appear to be more concerned about their bottom line, Trafigura did not agree with the port of Amsterdam on the new proposed price and decided to conclude a new agreement with Tommy Ltd., a newly created company in Ivory Coast, which had no prior experience in such matters. 100 It is important to highlight that this Ivorian company was only created ten days before the arrival of the Probo Koala ship in Abidjan, 101 a fact that might suggest that this company was created for that purpose. It is also evident that, before the dumping of these wastes in Abidjan, Trafigura was fully aware of the level of their toxicity and that they could have harmful effects on human lives and the environment.
According to a report by Amnesty International, the toxic wastes in question were dispersed 'in at least 18 sites near the inhabited and business places in Abidjan during the night of 19 August 2006.' 102 The report of the UN Human Rights Council of 2008 also alleged that other similar wastes were dumped later during the night of 14 September 2006 in Abidjan. 103 Immediately after the occurrence of the incident, people who lived around the sites where these wastes were dumped caught different diseases. 104 Different reports alleged that 15 people died, 69 persons were hospitalised and as many as 108,000 went through medical consultations. 105 According to Jägers, 'the Trafigura ship incident of Abidjan has resulted in tragic consequences for human lives and environment. ' 106 More specifically, the rights which were violated include the right to life, the right to health, the right to information, the right to food and wellbeing, rights to a satisfactory environment, the right to private life and the right to development. All the listed rights are recognised under different international and regional human rights instruments including the ACHPR to which the Ivory Coast is a party.
iii. The Victims' Endeavours to Access Effective Remedies Few days after the Probo Koala incident of Abidjan, the Ivorian state prosecutor opened a criminal investigation against those who were suspected to be involved in these outrageous acts and arrested some of them. 107 Among those arrested were three high officials of Trafigura who were present in Ivory Coast and representatives of the Ivorian company Tommy Ltd. 108 As a legal person, however, Trafigura was not a subject of the investigation as Ivorian law does not provide for criminal liability of legal persons. 109 However, surprisingly, when this case was ongoing before the Ivorian courts the government of the Ivory Coast entered into negotiations with the Trafigura Group without any prior consultation with victims. These negotiations resulted in an out-of-court settlement in February 2017. 110 In this agreement, the Trafigura Group agreed to pay USD 198 million for the compensation of the victims but against the release of their employees who were arrested. Under the same agreement, Ivory Coast also agreed to waive any other action against the Trafigura Group in domestic courts in relation to that incident. 111 However, Trafigura has continued to deny any responsibility for the abuses in question. 112 This agreement has negatively affected the victims' rights of access to effective remedies in domestic jurisdictions in many ways. First, as mentioned earlier, the agreement was signed without any prior consultation with the victims which means that those who signed it did not have enough information about what should be redressed. Secondly, victims who have not been compensated or those who received insufficient compensation cannot bring their cases in domestic courts in Ivory Coast. Moreover, as the above-mentioned agreement concerned civil cases only, this agreement constituted a barrier for victims who would like to initiate criminal proceedings against Trafigura group in Ivory Coast. But in March 2008, the Court of Appeal in Abidjan dismissed the complainants' request by ruling that the evidence to proceed with their case was lacking. 113 After exhausting all domestic remedies in Ivory Coast, some victims filed their case before the English courts due to the fact that, as mentioned before, the Probo Koala ship was charted by the Trafigura London office. This case was introduced before the London High Court in November 2006 by a number of victims who were estimated to be around 30,000.
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After three years of proceedings, in September 2009, another out-of-court agreement was concluded between the parties to the case. Under this new agreement, Trafigura accepted to pay GBP 1,000 to each of the claimants for compensation. 115 But again, this agreement was achieved with an obligation for victims to release a declaration stating that the toxic waste dumped in the streets of Abidjan by the Probo Koala ship did not have the potential to cause any serious injury or death.
In addition to the proceedings which took place in the UK in 2008, the Dutch Prosecutor had also opened a criminal case against the Trafigura Group and some of its employees. The director of the Amsterdam Port Service (APS), where the Probo Koala ship departed to Abidjan from, and the Municipality of Amsterdam were also concerned by these investigations. 117 But before the Dutch courts, the Trafigura Group and its co-accused were only accused for their illegal acts which took place in the Netherlands, not in the Ivory Coast. Trafigura was charged with illegal exportation of toxic waste from the Netherlands to Africa; an act which infringes the European regulations on the shipment of such waste. Other co-accused were considered as accomplices in that operation with different levels of liability. 118 The proceedings in this case took four years in which the Trafigura Group was sentenced to pay EUR one million and the company's employees were condemned to various suspended sentences of imprisonment. 119 The cases of other co-accused, like the Director of the APS and the Amsterdam Municipality, were declared inadmissible under Dutch law. 
iv. Obstacles Met by the Victims to Access Effective Remedies
The analysis of the facts in this case demonstrates that two major obstacles have obstructed victims' access to effective remedies in domestic jurisdictions. Firstly, the economic power of the Trafigura Group. While the evidence revealed that the crew of the Probo Koala knew beforehand that the waste was highly toxic, to avoid its responsibility the Trafigura group negotiated an agreement with the Ivorian government where neither party consulted the victims before or during these negotiations. The outcome of this agreement resulted in a denial of the victims' right to access effective remedies. The Trafigura Group paid a certain amount of money -officially for the compensation of the victims -against the release of its employees who were arrested as well as the renunciation and the prohibition of any other action against this MNC in Ivory Coast in relation to the same case. Given the large number of victims and the violations which occurred during the Probo Koala incident in Abidjan, even if the Ivorian government should have used the proceeds of the settlement to compensate the victims, this amount would be insufficient. Secondly, the Ivorian justice system lacked an applicable law to criminally prosecute the Trafigura Group as a private legal entity which is a common barrier in many AUMSs.
In regard to the case which was introduced in the UK, first, this case was again interrupted by another out-of-court settlement in which not all victims were represented. Secondly, according to the Council of Europe, 'a remedy is only effective if it is available and sufficient.'
121 Given the number of victims, it is normal that the harm suffered by each one be different. But under that agreement, every person who was represented was entitled to receive GBP 1,000, which probably was insufficient for some of them. Third, although UK officials were pressured by different organisations to commence criminal proceedings be committed by MNCs in violation of the Charter's provisions. For instance, on the African continent, many reports frequently allege that MNCs fail to meet the requirement of maintaining a satisfactory environment in the oil extraction industry; such acts infringe Article 24 of the African Charter. 132 To enforce the provisions of the African Charter, as well as other relevant human rights instruments adopted under the auspices of the African regional organisation (OAU/AU), the ACHPR was established under the same instrument. 133 As mentioned earlier, the ACHPR has already tried a number of cases of human rights violations involving MNCs which were committed in the AUMS. According to some scholars, nowadays, states are gradually losing their monopoly on being seen as the only subjects of international law as MNCs have also become duty bearers in regard to human rights issues. 134 As legal entities, today MNCs have duties and responsibilities under the African Charter as well as under other human rights instruments.
To supplement the shortcomings of the ACHPR in the fulfilment of its mandate of protecting human rights across the AUMS, an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACtHPR) was created. 135 The ACtHPR was created by a protocol that was adopted in 1998 and which entered into force in 2004. 136 First, this instrument commits the AU to the principles of freedom, equality, justice, peace and dignity as well as to the fundamental rights and duties contained in different human rights instruments and declarations adopted by the AU and other international organisations. 137 It also vests the ACtHPR with the mandate to enforce the provisions of the African Charter, the protocol itself and other human rights instruments ratified by the concerned AUMS. 138 Moreover, in May 2012, the AU adopted a protocol providing the court with powers to rule on international crimes committed within member states without any exception. 139 Additionally, Article 46 C of the Protocol to the Statute of the ACtHPR (27 June 2014) provides the ACtHPR with powers to deal directly with the MNCs' criminal liabilities in case they commit human rights abuses in member States. 140 At the sub-regional levels, most African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have also put mechanisms in place to protect human rights in their respective regions. Understandably, the initial mandates of these RECs are to improve their trade and other economic relations. 141 However, the RECs have gradually acknowledged the reality that their economic goals cannot be achieved without integrating respect for human rights into their activities. 142 This is why most of them integrated human rights provisions in their constituent treaties and their member states are parties to other human rights instruments. 143 RECs are recognised by the AU under the Abuja Treaty of 3 June 1991. 144 Article 3(h) of this Treaty bases the pursuit of Africa's economic integration on the principles of 'recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights' in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter, accountability and economic justice. 145 Its Article 7(e) also gives powers to these RECs for creating their own Courts of Justice (CJ). 146 Currently, these CJs of different RECs have similar jurisdiction over human rights issues committed in their respective regions as the ACtJHPR. 147 Given the legal frameworks and mandates and some few good examples from the AU regional and sub-regional mechanisms, these institutions have potentialities that can be exploited to correct the shortcomings of their member states in proving effective remedies for victims of the MNCs' human rights abuses. However, the case studies discussed earlier in this paper have revealed that the non-redress of such abuses is a prevalent phenomenon on the African continent and the AU regional and sub-regional mechanisms remain virtually unused by victims. The same case studies have also exhibited that those victims who decide to seek remedies in foreign fora outside the African continent do not get any support from their home countries. Consequently, victims of the MNCs' wrongdoings committed in the AUMS seem to be left on their own in their quest for remedies, either in domestic courts or in other fora outside the African continent, a fact which seems to contradict the philosophy behind the concept of African solutions to African problems.
Conclusion
The right to access an effective remedy for victims of human rights violations is an internationally recognised right under international and regional instruments of human rights, regardless of whether their perpetrator is an individual or a legal entity such as an MNC. These instruments include measures to ensure procedural fairness to victims, whether by a court or any other competent body or mechanism, as well as the outcome of such proceedings including the relief afforded to victims. But nowadays, there are many MNCs operating in the AUMSs which are accused of being involved in human rights abuses and their victims face many obstacles to access effective remedies.
Through three selected case studies, the present article attempted to investigate and analyse what obstacles victims face, either in domestic jurisdictions, before the MNC's home jurisdiction or in other foreign jurisdictions. The selected cases are the Anvil Mining case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Talisman case of Sudan, and the Trafigura case of Ivory Coast. In this paper, two major points are underlined, the types of legal remedies used by victims and the obstacles they faced in each step of the procedure, either in their home countries or in other fora outside the African continent.
The analysis of the facts in these cases demonstrates that, in the Anvil Mining case of the DRC and the Trafigura case of Ivory Coast, both started in domestic jurisdictions and ended up in the MNCs' home jurisdictions. Moreover, two out-of-court settlements interrupted the Trafigura case's proceedings; one took place in Ivory Coast and the other in England. Regarding the Talisman case, this case started and ended in the US courts because victims were unable to introduce their case in the Sudanese courts. This was due to the fact that all the violations alleged against Talisman were directly committed by the Sudanese security forces and pro-government militias, meaning that victims feared for their physical safety. Sudan lacked an appropriate law that could be applied in this case because the Sudanese courts apply Sharia law even though all victims were non-Muslims.
The outcome of the proceedings in all three cases, either in the victims' home courts or in foreign domestic fora has resulted in a denial of the victims' right to access real and effective remedies. The discussions and analysis in these cases proved also that a reliance on the MNCs' home courts or on any other forum, is of a limited value because victims face other obstacles there.
The main obstacles faced by victims in the Anvil Mining case of the DRC included many dysfunctions and irregularities within the DRC's justice system. For example, the victims' difficulties in accessing their lawyers and the lack of co-operation with military officials, political interference within the justice system and the threat and intimidation of victims and their supporters. Whereas in the Trafigura case of Ivory Coast the power influence of Trafigura in conjunction with the lack of an appropriate law in the Ivorian justice system to prosecute legal entities undermined the victims' rights to access effective remedies in the Ivory Coast. These obstacles are not only present in the justice systems of the DRC and the Ivory Coast, but they also exist in many other AUMSs.
Among the major obstacles faced by victims in foreign jurisdictions are the unwillingness of the MNCs' home countries to prosecute them for their human rights abuses committed abroad, political interference, the possible diplomatic fallout between fora of prosecutions and home states of MNCs, the lack of financial resources by victims to commence and follow their cases abroad as well as the difficulties in conducting investigations and limited access to evidence. Considering all these obstacles faced by victims in their quest for remedies, either in domestic or foreign courts, the paper suggests that there is an urgent need for African regional and sub-regional solutions to fill this gap.
Discussions and analysis in this paper revealed, on the one hand, that the lack of redress of human rights abuses that are often committed by MNCs in the AUMS is a common phenomenon on the continent and African leaders contemplate its development passively. On the other hand, although African communities are those who are more affected by this issue, there are mechanisms at the AU regional and sub-regional levels that can be used to correct the shortcomings of national systems from member states in providing effective remedies for victims. Unfortunately, as it was revealed by the case studies, victims of these abuses from the African continent are somehow left in the hands of the MNCs in
